Introduction
Major changes have been occurring in the regulation of employment relations in the voluntarist Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) of Ireland and the UK. There are both differences and similarities between the employment relations contexts of Ireland and the UK, details of which are available elsewhere (EIRO, 2011) . A similar trend apparent in both jurisdictions is that traditional pluralism based on voluntarist collective negotiations between employers and unions has been unravelling. This is epitomized by declining collective bargaining coverage and union density (Kersley et al., 2006; CSO, 2010) . While Ireland differs from Britain by having had a national model of (voluntarist) social partnership for over twenty years, the national social pact contained a paradox in that the State and employers refused to recognize unions on a statutory basis (Teague and Donaghey, 2009 ). In any case, social partnership collapsed in 2010 during Ireland's deep economic crisis (McDonough and Dundon, 2010) . More generally, employment relations regulation in LMEs like the UK and Ireland has been recast due to pressures to free the market (Streeck, 1987; Barry, 2009) . In relation to employee voice, this has meant that the agenda has been shifting from indirect (collective) to decentred employerled direct (individual) regulation and from union to non-union voice. As a result there is increased emphasis on individualized employment relations regulation, buttressed in part by managerial experimentation with HRM, along with globalised pressures on State institutions to conform to neo-liberal ideologies of market regulation. Notwithstanding some nuances in corporate governance in LMEs, a dominant factor in many organizations remains servicing short-term shareholder primacy, rather than developing longer-term collaborative stakeholder approaches; although Armour et al., (2003:550) view the EU Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive as providing "a major counterveiling force to shareholder primacy".
External regulatory changes have important implications for the capacity of both micro and macro-level industrial relations actors to occupy what has been conceptualized as the 'regulatory space' affecting employment relations (Crouch, 1986; Hancher and Moran, 1989; Scott, 2001; Barry, 2009) . Using the example of the EU Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive, the contribution of this article is its analysis of factors influencing occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice within the voluntarist context of LMEs. In doing so the article advances a multi-level, multi-dimensional analytical framework on which the occupancy of regulatory space can be evaluated in comparative national contexts.
The primary research question addressed is: 'how and to what extent has the EU ICE Directive affected the occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice within the voluntarist IR regimes of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland?
The second section considers the concept of 'regulatory space' as it relates to industrial relations theory and practice. The third section considers how there has been a legal recasting of regulatory space for employee rights and then, more specifically, explores the European ICE Directive as a regulatory arena. This is followed, in section four, by an outline of research methods used in the four multisite companies with cross-border operations in both ROI and NI. The case findings are then reported in section five. Finally, the conclusions discuss the empirical findings against the analytical framework for advancing understanding of occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice. Future policy implications are also considered.
The 'regulatory space' of industrial relations
The concept of 'regulatory space' is a very useful and underutilized analytical tool for assessing the impact of employment regulation (Hancher and Moran, 1989; Scott, 2001; Barry, 2009) . Regulatory space has been defined as:
"..the range of regulatory issues subject to public decision. Proponents claim that its dimensions and occupants can be understood by examining regulation in any particular national setting, and by analyzing that setting in terms of its specific political, legal and cultural attributes" (Berg et al., 2005:73) .
In relation to applicability to industrial relations, regulatory space concerns the range of IR issues subject to decision by various actors -either unilaterally or jointly. Furthermore, Scott (2001:331) observes that: "The Regulatory space metaphor draws attention to the fact that regulatory authority and responsibility are frequently dispersed between a number of organisations, public and private ... it looks at the interactions of each of the players in the space, and can recognise plural systems of authority".
A number of distinctive conceptual points are important here. First, space, by definition, is open for occupation. The extent to which either party can occupy space is dependent on their ability to mobilise resources and their capacity to prevent others from occupying the same space. In this context the occupation of regulatory space is a dynamic relationship shaped and governed by a 'frontier of control' (Goodrich, 1920) . This leads to a second related conceptual point: the space can be unequally distributed between actors and there may be major and/or minor participants jostling to advance or retreat their 'frontier'. For example , Donaghey et al (2011) argue how contestable dynamics surrounding employee voice can chart a path of silence rather than voice. Other research points out that trade unions, as traditional labour market actors, are losing space while other competitive institutions are occupying regulatory space and expanding their influence (Barry, 2009 ). Large multinational employers and their representative associations are notable exemplars of institutions that are colonizing regulatory space for voice and participation (Hancher and Moran, 1989) . A third point is that space is likely to be size-specific, depending on national, sector or enterprise level circumstances. The concept of regulatory space is therefore both multi-level and multi-dimensional. In this way we can track developments from EU and national level down to sector and company-level. Fourth, actors may contest regulatory space in defined regulatory arenas: labour market regulations can be viewed as contestable spheres where actors may occupy regulatory space to pursue their own preferences on distinct issues (Hancher and Moran, 1989) . The defined regulatory arena for the purpose of this article is the ICE Directive and we assess, for instance, if it has had any impact in encouraging employers to share decision-making power with employees by engaging in new or revised consultation mechanisms arising from the regulatory requirements contained in the Directive and subsequent national legislation.
Overlapping these conceptual issues is recognition that regulation can be a highly political process (Martinez-Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004) . The greater the space colonized by a party to the employment relationship the higher the probability of achieving desired policy preferences and outcomes. Finally, the analytical approach here enables assessment of regulatory change as a contestable and moving entity, rather than a static depiction of industrial relations.
Factors affecting occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice More specifically, for the purpose of this article, we have identified various external and internal contextual factors that can affect occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice at work, and which can be used to provide a deeper and more informed assessment of how and to what extent occupancy of regulatory space for voice is determined:
External factors: a. Regulatory impact of ICE Regulations:
A potential factor affecting regulatory space for employee voice is whether the ICE Regulations can constrain managerial prerogative and provide employees with space to counterbalance employer power (Dundon et al., 2006; Dobbins 2010b; Hall and Purcell, 2010) .
b. Other external factors shaping the employee voice agenda at enterprise level:
Other external factors affecting regulatory space for employee voice include competitive market pressures; the role of the State (EU-level and Nation State); employer associations; and trade unions. (Hancher and Moran, 1989; Streeck, 1995a; Barnard and Deakin, 2000; Barry, 2009; McDonough and Dundon, 2010) .
Internal factors:
c. Impact of workplace union presence on voice:
Union presence has an impact on the nature and outcomes of employee voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004) .
d. Worker (union) mobilisation to contest the voice agenda:
Workers may collectively mobilize to contest the employer agenda (Kelly, 2005) , and this countervailing source of power may impact on occupation of regulatory space for voice.
e. Voice as a form of union avoidance:
Employers may use non-union forms of voice as a means to avoid recognising unions (Gall, 2009). f. Whether employers are strategic or opportunistic:
The extent to which employer's action are strategically intended, or, alternatively, improvised and pragmatically opportunistic, can affect the nature of occupation of space for voice (Kochan et al., 1986; Allen 2004 ). g. Robustness or shallowness of voice in practice:
A review of the literature allows us to suggest that robust forms of voice give employees more opportunities to occupy regulatory space for voice than shallow forms (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Dundon et al., 2006) . Robustness or shallowness can be measured by depth, scope, level and form of voice (Marchington et al., 1993) :  Depth -extent to which employees (or their representatives) share in decision-making with management (from information provision to joint decision-making);  Scope -range of issues on which employees (or their representatives) have a say;  Level -hierarchical level in an organisation at which voice mechanisms operate;  Form -type of 'voice' mechanism used, which can be direct (individuals or small groups) and/or indirect (via worker representatives).
h. Voice utility:
Voice utility concerns the extent of employee satisfaction or dissatisfaction with voice arrangements, which can influence how successful they are (Freeman et al., 2007; Donaghey et al., 2011) .
Importance of power for regulatory space Simultaneously, as Lukes notes, power can also be exercised in less obvious ways.
Therefore the second and less explicit face of non decision-making power relates to how actors prevent certain issues being discussed in the first place, or decisions about them from being taken. An example is political lobbying by employers over employment legislation (Dundon et al, 2006) , or tactical use of sophisticated nonunion voice regimes to stonewall and delay statutory union recognition (Gall, 2009 ).
The third face, ideological power, is the least observable and concerns the power to shape and manipulate peoples' interests and wishes: even ensure that they accept or desire situations that can be contrary to their own interests. This third face of power may be evident where management seek to deploy various cultural programmes to win employee hearts and minds as a form of employer control (Willmott, 1993) . Above all, the continuous and forceful discourse promulgated by many employers and politicians that employment regulations should not interfere with employer choice over employee voice has gained both an ideological and practical dominance within and across neo-liberal market regimes (McDonough and Dundon, 2010) .
Employer colonisation of employment rights: jostling for the regulatory space of employee voice
Discourse about the purpose of employment regulation has clearly changed in recent decades. Crucially, the emphasis on market liberalization, a (re)assertion of managerial prerogative, and experimentation with HRM practices, has coincided with partial reassessment by the State (at EU and national level) of the purpose of legal regulation of the employment relationship (Streeck, 1995a; Martinez-Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004; Barry, 2009) . Historically, the prime purpose of legal regulation was protecting employees against laissez-faire capitalism and its power asymmetries (Flanders, 1970) . Since the 1980s, a partial reassessment of regulatory purpose and function is discernable, especially in LMEs. Importantly, regulation can now be partly interpreted as a means of employer protection against collectively organized employees (Wilkinson et al., 2007; Barry, 2009 (Streeck, 1995a: 45-49) . Significantly, employment laws have become more 'reflexive', allowing employers at enterprise-level greater latitude and space in shaping their 'preferred mode of intervention' (Barnard and Deakin 2000: 341) .
The transposing of the ICE Directive provides an appropriate lens through which to examine the impact of employment regulation on information and consultation rights; in particular, how labour market actors have occupied and/or vacated the regulatory space for employee voice. Hall and Purcell (2010) Notwithstanding this generality, the Directive itself is explicit in setting out statutory requirements for representative based I&C rights.
Both the UK and Irish governments transposed national I&C regulations in a minimalist manner (Doherty, 2008; Dobbins, 2010b; Hall and Purcell, 2010) . In the In Northern Ireland, the Industrial Court has had one case. Case study research in the UK (Terry et al., 2009; Hall and Purcell, 2010) 
Research Methods and Cases
The data in this article is extracted from a larger research project examining the impact of ICE Regulations in sixteen organizations across the island of Ireland. Our rationale for case selection was companies with cross-border jurisdictions in the two national LME contexts of Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The research design is multiple case studies and, for the purpose of this article, four cross-border organisations with operations in both the ROI and NI were selected. BritCo to avoid unions and revamp the non-union forum were arguably driven more by emergent ad hoc opportunism than deliberate strategic intent -if anything management reacted to the collective agency of workers.
Evidently, the jostling for such an outcome was far from smooth. Indeed, the recast I&C forum was only partially successful, as many employees felt that the forum developed over time into an ineffective 'talking-shop', more appropriate to 'tea and toilet' issues than substantive consultation with a view to reaching agreement.
BritCo Vocal was unfavourably compared by ROI employees with unionised arrangements in NI. Significantly, forum reps found that once the union recognition drive had subsided, the range of issues on which employees could engage with management waned. Therefore, in terms of voice utility, there was From its inception it has never been really explicit…we don't deal with trade unions … We engaging with employees and we operate a culture where we hope employees would not feel the need for joining unions (Manager).
Therefore, the first key factor affecting regulatory space for employee voice at
RetailCo was a subtle union avoidance/substitution approach, manifested in the employer's desire to remain non-union. The non-union voice system operates through a sequence of meetings at store, regional, divisional and national levels.
These all conform to a uniform format throughout the company. Meetings are supposed to occur at each level on a quarterly basis, starting at store level and followed by meetings at progressively higher levels so that, where necessary, The 'shallow' nature of I&C was a third factor shaping occupancy of space for voice at RetailCo. To a large extent, management occupied the regulatory space for I&C owing to the hierarchical structure of the Bottom-Up voice system. The multi-level structure meant that the depth and scope of issues available to employees was limited and, moreover, the agenda and outcome of decisions was mostly controlled by management. The senior HR team were satisfied that the Bottom-Up structure fulfilled the requirements of the ICE Regulations. Senior management generally evaluated the system in positive terms, although tended to describe the system as part of the company's broader HR strategy of striving towards high-commitment HRM, rather than regulatory compliance with I&C requirements per se. 
ConcreteCo: dual voice in cross-border jurisdictional space
ConcreteCo is characterized by significant differences in occupation of regulatory space between the two jurisdictions of ROI and NI. Unions occupy elements of regulatory space in ROI, but in NI non-union employees exert very little influence (management unilaterally dominate workplace regulation). ConcreteCo use a variety of employee voice mechanisms across the island of Ireland, with outcomes depending on union presence. Therefore, union presence was a prominent factor shaping differences in occupation of space for employee voice in ROI and NI. In The rationale for divergent cross-border I&C practices at ConcreteCo seemed to be business model pragmatism and the flexibility afforded to managers by union absence in the North. Management's approach to I&C in NI was noticeably ad hoc and opportunistic, rather than constituting strategic or conscious intent to control the voice agenda. Nevertheless, issues like redundancy and working time were seen as easier for management to process in the North than the unionised South. Indeed, NI management considered the idea of consulting workers to be at best irksome, at worse an intrusion on managers' right to manage:
There is not highly developed consultation in our business….Personally I think the word 'consultation' is a misnomer, it is very much communication….Expectation for consultation isn't there from employees.
Consultation implies there is a party with information, there is an opportunity to give feedback on that information, the feedback is listened to, and as a result decisions are taken. That does not happen here (HR Manager, NI).
The unilateralism of management was confirmed by employees and managers themselves. Some NI employees expressed dissatisfaction with the 'shallow' nature of voice and wanted more opportunity to 'have a say and get feedback' and one stated that 'while on H&S matters we do influence things…on all else foremen and managers tell us things on a take it or leave it basis…not consultation really!' An administration manager, who is also the 'nominated' employee member of EuroForum, articulated the view that consulting employees can be dangerous from a management perspective:
You need to ask yourself, what do they need to know? Lots of information is highly confidential. We must be careful of what is portrayed to staff (Admin.
Manager, NI)
With regard to the ICE Regulations, ConcreteCo and its unions in ROI agreed that the Irish ICE Regulations would require no change in pre-existing agreements. A ROI union official said the ICE Regulations 'offered us nothing…best to ignore it'.
One ROI manager, very critical of the hype surrounding the ICD from employers' bodies, said:
Going back to what IBEC did when this was coming in….everyone was thinking Armageddon is on the way. But I don't think Armageddon has come. It hasn't had a major effect on us here because we were doing it anyway.
In NI, meanwhile, a manager claimed there was awareness of the Regulations: 'We were aware of it, but felt we didn't need to do anything. (The) legal side of things is a difficulty, because speed of decision making is affected by excessive consultation'.
ServCo.: 'old' and 'new' cross-border industrial relations regimes
ServCo also has very different I&C practices in ROI and NI, and we identify a clear In the context of a former state-owned entity, ServCo unions in the ROI have traditionally had long-standing power and influence over regulatory space for I&C, and union density remains very high. Therefore, union power and readiness to mobilize it collectively to contest management's agenda were prominent factors affecting regulatory space for voice in ROI. ServCo has multi-union collective bargaining and consultative arrangements in ROI covering all employees.
Therefore, compared to our other cases, the union consultative structures in ServCo 'although I was in the union I wasn't going in as a union rep I was going in as employee rep'. The ELF consists of four employee representatives, a HR mgr, and head of operations. An employee pointed to some overlap between issues the ELF and union dealt with. The ELF had an early collective bargaining type role, albeit a restricted one, as both ELF employee representatives and IMPACT union representatives were involved in negotiating a three-year pay deal. The ongoing idea was for the ELF to meet every two months to discuss issues of concern to employees, like better meals, business performance, staffing changes. But the ELF met infrequently, has no real formal structure, and an employee said it has 'dwindled off a bit and gone quiet'. The site manager attributed this 'stagnation' to fewer issues arising after things bedded in at the new site -adding that he might 'regenerate it'. It appears to be mainly a communications tool rather than consulting with a view to reaching agreement. A HR manager described it as an 'information giving and getting exercise'. No training is provided for representative roles by the company or union, and there is little institutional support.
In summary, influenced by the small size of the NI site, good local managementemployee relations, and employee dissatisfaction with the IMPACT union, most I&C currently occurs through informal direct face-to-face communication between managers and employees rather than via representatives:
Direct communications is where it's at in Belfast. Management doesn't necessarily seek out reps to give them the heads up..there is no advance notice (for reps) (HR manager).
There was little overall awareness of ICE Regulations in ServCo ROI or NI. The exceptions were a HR manager in ROI, who said the company reaction was: are existing arrangements in compliance? There was also awareness among union officials.
Discussion and conclusions
Using the regulatory example of the EU Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive, the contribution of this working paper is its analysis of factors that influence occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice at work in the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) of the Republic of Ireland and Northern
Ireland. The article has advanced a multi-level, multi-dimensional analytical framework to evaluate occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice in comparative national contexts.
We conclude that the analytical framework for regulatory space provides a more refined assessment of employer and employee responses to employee voice regulation -specifically, the ICE Regulations. Applied to industrial relations, regulatory space concerns the range of issues subject to decision by the main actors (employers, employees, representatives), with some actors capturing more space than others (Barry, 2009 (Lavelle et al., 2010) .
Given this neo-liberal ideological assault on the contested terrain of employment regulation (especially in LMEs), we agree with other observers that employer occupancy of regulatory space for employee voice is influenced in part by a reassessment of the regulatory function of the State (at EU and Nation State level) (Barry, 2009) . We argue that employment regulation can now be partly reinterpreted as a means of protecting employers against worker collectivism, whereas in the past the emphasis was on protecting employees against exploitation (Flanders, 1970) . In line with this State reinterpretation of legal purpose, and consistent with the principle of EU subsidiarity and neo-voluntarism (Streeck, 1995a) , the ICE Directive is rather general and open-ended, and gave individual Member States significant latitude on the instruments used to enact it.
Consequently, both the UK and Irish governments transposed national ICE Regulations in a light touch minimalist manner (Doherty, 2008; Dobbins, 2010b; Hall and Purcell, 2010) . In particular, ICE Regulations in these two jurisdictions do not bestow automatic I&C rights on employees and are permissive of enterprise specific individualised direct communication. The implication is that in Ireland and the UK, the State has effectively circumscribed regulatory space for employee I&C rights in favour of an employer dominated neo-liberalised regime which has institutionalised voluntarist regulation and evidently provides employees with few counterbalancing powers to constrain employers to provide more robust voice over key issues. We also conclude that ambivalence of national unions in Ireland and the UK towards contesting the space opened by the ICE Directive has aided employers in occupying space for voice. The upshot is that employer experimentation with highly variable non-union forms of enterprise-based regulation (HRM, employee consultative forums, and direct employee involvement) is a challenge to unions as they struggle to retain receding regulatory space (Barry, 2009 Allen (2004) identifies as the 'varieties of firms' approach.
Our empirical findings display similarities to those of Hall and colleagues in the UK that the regulatory outcome of the ICE Regulations has been 'legislativelyprompted unilateralism', with management dominating I&C arrangements, and employees having little influence (Terry et al., 2009; Hall and Purcell, 2010) . This trajectory of employer dominated regulatory space for employee voice is generally supported by the empirical evidence in our four cross-border case studies, where the common tendency was for employees to remain marginalised. However, we would insert the caveat that employer colonization of regulatory space for I&C was more complete in some of our workplaces than others -groups of workers in two of our cases mobilized to contest space for voice. Turning to internal factors affecting regulatory space for voice, the presence or not of unions had a significant impact on robustness of employee voice. The most robust forms of I&C were evident in highly unionized workplaces (notably ServCo ROI), and the most shallow were evident in non-union workplaces (notable ConcreteCo NI). In relation to this, whether I&C arrangements were robust or shallow clearly affected how much space for voice employers or employees occupied across our four cases. Also, worker (union) willingness and power to mobilize collectively to contest management control of the voice agenda was a prominent factor affecting space for voice in two instances: BritCo (ROI) and ServCo (ROI). At BritCo (ROI) union members mobilized collectively to pursue union recognition rights for collective bargaining purposes and, in so doing, opposed a management sponsored non-union employee representative Forum. Meanwhile, union members at ServCo (ROI) contested successive management restructuring plans that they feared could erode their regulatory space for voice. While such collective power mobilizations did not mean that employees achieved all they wanted, it did mean that they set certain boundaries to employer capture of regulatory space. In some sites, employers used non-union voice mechanisms as a means of union avoidance.
This was explicitly so at BritCo (ROI), and more subtly at RetailCo.
Furthermore, across the cases, employer actions to control the space for voice tended on balance to be more reactionary and opportunistic than constituting strategic intent and planning. It is helpful to frame this in terms of degrees of strategic intent or opportunism. There was some evidence that employer actions were guided by elements of strategic intent and planning to control the space for voice: this applied particularly at ServCo (NI) -where management explicitly sought to define the space for employee voice prior to the actual opening of a new
Greenfield site -rolling out new industrial relations policies and setting limits on the union role. For the most part though (notably at ConcreteCo NI, and BritCo ROI), management actions to control the voice agenda were ad hoc and opportunistic. Finally, voice utility was found to be important. In many of the workplaces we visited, employees expressed dissatisfaction with the limited say they had over workplace decisions. This was most acute where voice was perceived to be especially shallow, management dominated, and not sufficiently independent -such as ConcreteCo (NI), BritCo (ROI) and RetailCo. The matter of voice utility was quite complex at one workplace in particular, ServCo (NI). Here, voice was ostensibly shallow, but ServCo (NI) employees were satisfied dealing directly and informally with local management, having become dissatisfied with their ROI-based union (IMPACT) and revoking membership of this union. Yet many employees still wanted a union as an insurance policy in case something did go wrong and subsequently applied to join the UK GMB union.
There are important policy and practice implications arising from our case findings relating to distribution of power in LMEs. While our article illustrates that employers have generally colonized regulatory space for I&C, it is what they do with this power that matters. And the evidence from our cases and elsewhere would suggest that employer experimentalism with unilateral power may not necessarily produce optimal performance outcomes at workplace or national level (Streeck, 1997; Coats, 2004) . A key point is that power imbalances at the workplace in voluntarist LME regimes can restrict the potential of I&C structures to create enduring mutual gains (Dobbins, 2010a) . In LMEs, employers tend to limit the requisite space to employees required to enable a distribution of power necessary for genuine participation, as they seek to preserve managerial prerogative. On the other hand, employees may want more influence than employers find acceptable (Freeman and Lazear, 1995) .
In short, it is difficult for voluntarist I&C practices to gravitate towards the requisite power equilibrium that could facilitate more expansive high productivity coalitions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Kaufmann, 2009 ). This power imbalance renders most I&C structures unstable and short-term. Extensive individual employer experimentation with voice structures in LMEs may also incur substantial economic transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) . These issues were evident in our case organizations. Without strong external 'beneficial constraints'
(like German works councils), most employers when left to their own choices will introduce sub-optimal voice systems that may not meet their own or their employees mutual interests (Streeck, 1997) . In terms of voice utility, workers may express dissatisfaction with employer dominated fora, which occurred in our cases.
In the absence of regulatory constraints (which employers may find beneficial once enacted), it is difficult to balance the 'risks' underpinning a stable equilibrium between management's right to manage and employee demands for meaningful voice (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005) . Following Streeck (1995b) Finally, in terms of avenues for future research, the analytical framework for regulatory space could be adapted to assess other labour market institutions and contemporary industrial relations issues, such as union recognition, temporary agency regulation, and so forth.
